Nuclear Disarmament, Non Proliferation Treaty and Nuclaer Free Zones

Last Revision February 1 2015

The first nuclear bomb was exploded at 5:30 A.M. on July 16 1945 in a remote region of new Mexico, USA.The first Uranium bomb was dropped was exploded over Hiroshima at 8:16 A.M. on August 6 1945. The second Plutonium bomb was dropped over Nagasaki 3 days later at 11.02 A.M. At the end of World War II only the United States had plants to produce plutonium and enriched Uranium and has consistently tries to prevent the spread on nuclear weapons. It did not help Great Britain, France or Russia who independently became nuclear producers. During the Cold War, US and Soviet Union maneuvered in order to be able to retaliate for a nuclear attack, leading to the position that came to be known as mutually assured destruction in which each nation could survive a nuclear attack with enough nuclear weapons intact to exact devastating destruction on the attacker.

In 1968, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. A Good summary of the NPT and events subsequent to its adoption may be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty

The treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968 and came into effect on March 5 1970 - when 97 nations had signed it and 47 ratified it. It came into force for an initial 25 years. In 1995, the treaty was renewed for an indefinite period.

Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III:

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty

Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Note: North Korea has withdrawn from from the NPT and in November 2011 Iran started to discuss withdrawal.

Nuclear Weapon States
Belgium, Canada, China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Soviet Union Successor Countries Kazakhstan, United States, United Kingdom,

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Latin American and Caribbean - Treaty of Tlatelolco On April 29 1963 Under the initiative of Mexico Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico issued a joint declaration agreeing to sign a multilateral Latin American agreement whereby countries undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching device All nations in the area have subsequent signed except cuba
Even though Argentina later became a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and signed the NPT it had gone a long way toward producing nuclear weapons before this occurred under a military junta.

Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands - Treaty of Rarotonga In August 1984 13 member states of Pacific Forum (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, The Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Western Samoa, KIribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, The Cook Islands and Niue endorsed an Australian proposal to establish a nuclear free in the South Pacific. The Treaty signed at Rarotonga in the Cook Islands on August 6 1985 produced the second nuclear free zone.
African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone - Pelindaba Treaty June 1995 Treaty enters in force when signed by 28 Nations Treaty prohibits the development of weapons and their being stationed on the territory of any signatory
Southeast Asia On December 15 1995 Ministers of Myanmar (formerly Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam Malaysia, and Singapore, Indonesia signed treaty forming a nuclear-free zone encompassing most of this region. The treaty encompasses the national territories of the signatories and the ocean areas stretching 200 acres from land. The Treaty will go into effect once ratified by 7 of the 10 signatories
Middle East

In 1974 Iran first proposed a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East to the UN General Assembly.

UN Security Council Resolution 687, which terminated the Persian Gulf War in 1991, adopted the idea of both an NWFZ and a Weapons of Mass Destruction free zone (WMDFZ), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension conference in 1995 advocated an NWFZ in its "Resolution on the Middle East."

General Assembly Resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, General Assembly 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 9 January 1995, 50/66 of 9 January 1996, 51/41 of 7 January 1997, 52/34 of 23 December 1997, 53/74 of 4 January 1999,

Also Resolutions on The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East including 52/41 of 31 December 1997, 53/80 of 8 January 1999

Israel abstained from votes on the resolution for several years but then suddenly produced its own draft in 1980, asking for direct negotiations between the countries in the region rather than installing a zone. After negotiations with Egypt, the Israeli draft of the resolution was withdrawn, and for the first time, all of the countries in the region voted unanimously in favor of a slightly revised Egyptian draft. Nevertheless, little political progress ensued.

Security Council Resolution 687 renewed the call for an NWFZ and a zone free of all WMD in its preamble and noted in its 14th operational paragraph that Iraq’s disarmament represented one step toward such a zone that would also be free of “missiles for their delivery.” It also included a resolution under Chapter VII, which opens the door for mandating enforcement action. Although the United Nations enforced Iraq’s obligations to disarm, the UN Security Council failed to pay attention to the wider regional zone in the following years

UN Security Council Resolution 687, which terminated the Persian Gulf War in 1991, adopted the idea of both an NWFZ and a WMDFZ. UN Security Council Resolution 687 renewed the call for an NWFZ and a zone free of all WMD in its preamble and noted in its 14th operational paragraph that Iraq’s disarmament represented one step toward such a zone that would also be free of “missiles for their delivery.” The Security Council even adopted a resolution under Chapter VII, which opens the door for mandating enforcement action. Although the United Nations enforced Iraq’s obligations to disarm, the UN Security Council failed to pay attention to the wider regional zone in the following years, much to the chagrin of the Arab countries that worked to get this concept into the resolution at its inception.

The Madrid process brought Israel and all its immediate Arab neighbors, as well as other Arab countries (although not Libya or Iran) to the negotiation table for the first time, under the auspices of the United States and Russia. Palestinian representatives participated in the Jordanian delegation. Lasting from 1992 to 1995, the ACRS talks combined briefings on arms control by representatives with lessons from the East-West experience with direct negotiations.

Egypt wanted nuclear disarmament on the agenda early on while Israel insisted on discussing it only at a much later in the process, once the parties had established a lasting, reliable peace. Egypt also urged the participants to endorse a resolution inviting all parties in the region to accede to the NPT in advance of the 1995 NPT extension conference. Israel rejected this proposal. Because Egypt was not willing to continue without the nuclear subject on the agenda and Israel was not willing to discuss the issue at this early stage, the talks were suspended.

For Israel, Nuclear weapons are the guarantor of national survival against hostile Arab and Iranian neighbors. Only a lasting and sustainable peace could mitigate and satisfy this concern to a degree that Israel might be willing to put its nuclear capability on the negotiating table. Arabs and Iranians do not see Israel’s nuclear weapons as a defensive precaution.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered that Iran was enriching uranium and producing plutonium, the two materials necessary for a nuclear bomb. Iran insists the work is for fuel production, not weapons which is technically within its rights under the treaty to continue. Iran is finishing its first nuclear power reactor in Bushehr. Meanwhile, it has been building a gas centrifuge enrichment plant (used to enrich uranium to make it usable for fuel, or for weapons) at Natanz, that has nothing to do with energy production according to the US State Department. During construction the Iran ignored IAEA's call for states to provide early design information on nuclear facilities. It argues that it needs to make its own reactor fuel because it cannot count on foreign suppliers. It argues that it requires nuclear energy so that it can export its oil and gas. US says the logic does not add up.

Iran is a party to the NPT, but was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute. In November 2003 IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program. After about two years of EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran temporarily suspending its enrichment program, the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. This was reported to the Security Council in 2006,after which the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its enrichment. Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.

The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and is continuing its work on verifying the absence of undeclared activities. In February 2008, the IAEA also reported that it was working to address "alleged studies" of weaponization, based on documents provided by certain Member States, which those states claimed originated from Iran. Iran rejected the allegations as "baseless" and the documents as "fabrications." In June 2009, the IAEA reported that Iran had not “cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.”

The United States concluded that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards obligations, and further argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment program was for weapons purposes and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation obligations.

Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Iran also states that its enrichment program is part of its civilian nuclear energy program, which is allowed under Article IV of the NPT.

France, Germany and Britain have been trying to hammer out an agreement with Iran to stop making plutonium and enriching uranium. In mid-November, after the Nov. 15 IAEA deadline for suspending their activities passed, the counties did reach an agreement, but Iran has said the pause is temporary. The European negotiators would much rather make it a permanent accord to halt production. Iran wants recognition that it has the right to develop nuclear technologies. It is true that Article 4 of the treaty gives members the “inalienable” right to a nuclear program if it is used for "peaceful" purposes.

South Asia: India and Pakistan South Asia Nuclear Crisis

North Korea

In 2006 and 2009 North Korea announced Nuclear Tests.

The BBC Guide to North Korea

North Korea nuclear timeline

Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)on North Korea

Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)on North Korea

Websites

International Atomic Energy Agency

The History of the IAEA. A chronology of key dates and developments

The IEAA guide to the nonproliferation treaty

The IAEA publication on the Model Additional Protocol

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Global security issues, especially nuclear and weapons of mass destruction

Center for Defense Information

World Policy Institute A major source of independent information and policy analysis on the problem of global weapons proliferation.

Nuclear Control Institute NCI is a research and advocacy center specializing in problems of nuclear proliferation

Arms Control Association ACA is dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. This site has a plethora of relevant information relevant to the NPT treaty.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)

The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy This institute provides reporting, analysis and strategic thinking on issues relevant to peace and security, with special emphasis on treaties and multilateral approaches.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace publications on nonproliferation

The U.S. Dept. of State Website for the 2005 nonproliferation treaty review conference (includes links to the preparatory committee meetings)

Nova's Global Guide to Nuclear Missiles

A tutorial on the nonproliferation treaty by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies

The Why Files -A look at the nuclear bomb

The Atomic Age - CNN's multimedia timeline

The Global Security Institute Timeline

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Website

Events and Lectures on nonproliferation provided by the Arms Control Association

References

Mozley, Robert E. (1998) The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998